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I. Introduction and Oven-jew

A

quick glance at the Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols is
sufficient to reveal that the treaty rules governing the conduct of parties to
a non-international armed conflict (NIAC) are less developed than those governing parties engaged in international armed conflicts (lACs). The total number of
treaty provisions governing the latter outstrips the number governing the fo rmer
by many dozens. While there is a range of historical and political reasons for this,
there is also a core practical q uestion that appears to have hampered the development of the law of armed conflict (LOAC) with respect to NIACs: How do we identify the specific actors to whom the rules in this area would apply?
Finding a satisfying answer to this q uestion-which in a variety of ways req uires
us to translate from familiar concepts and categories in the world of international
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armed conflict into the world of non-international armed confli ct-is both very
difficult and critically important. It is very difficult because in NIAC the amorphous, clandestine nature of the organizations with which we are dealing-and the
often mercurial nature of the relationship between individ uals and these organizations-<hallenges the instinctive desire that lawyers have to draw tight parallels between the clearly defined actors with which we are used to dealing in lAC
(including uniformed soldiers figh ting on behalf of often declared enemies with legal
personality and right authority) and the murkier ones that we are required to deal
with in NIAC. The parallels are there but frequently they are not as tidy as we want
them to be, and operators will tell us that if we define categories too rigidly, we will
impede their ability to meet the threat they are facing . Yet, if they are too loosely
drawn, then there is a risk of sanctioning deprivations oflife and liberty that will be
criticized as illegitimate and arbitrary.
Unsurprisingly, efforts to develop a clearer answer to this question have been at
the center of some very important legal conversations in recent years. In
Guantanamo habeas litigation, the U.S. government has been required to articulate in numerous pleadings how to assess whether someone is "part of' al Qaeda,
the Taliban or associated forces, and the U.S. federal courts (in particular the District
ofColwnbia (D.C.) Circuit) have built up some jurisprudence in this area. There
have also been efforts to synthesize expert opinion-notably, if not fully successfully, in the International Committee of the Red Cross's (ICRC's) Interpretive
Guidance! that was released in 2009. Finally, and most significan tly for purposes of
the emergence of shared international norms, States have been talking to each
other about their experience, some of which is of course shared experience, in
places like Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya.
This article will touch briefly on the ways in which the conversation about when
an individual loses protection fro m attack through membership in an organized
armed group (and related questions of what it means to take direct part in hostilities) have developed in the course of the last several years. In so doing, it will underscore that the development of the law in this area remains fo r the time being largely
in the hands of States, and, in particular, their executive branches. It will also give a
sense of where like- minded States with which the U.S. government works particularly closely have reached consensus in this area, as well as identify some areas
where there remains a range of views. To keep the scope of this exercise manageable, the paper will keep a narrow foc us on the threshold for membership in organized armed groups and direct participation in hostilities on the non -State side of a
NlAC. It will not address a number of important related questions that also have a
bearing on the question of when individuals lose imm unity from being made the
object of attack in non -international armed conflict, including questions about the
182

Stephen Pomper
point at which armed violence can be deemed an armed conflict, the level of cohesion that is required in order to deem an organization an "organized armed
group," the circumstances under which an organized armed group can be said to
be engaged in armed conflict , the geographic scope of armed conflict and the circumstances in which legal rules outside the law of armed confljct may be relevant.

II. Guantanamo Litigation
When in June 2008 the Supreme Court decided in the Boumedietle casel that
Guantanamo detainees would have an opportunity to challenge the legality of their
detention in U.S. fede ral court, without addressing the standard for who could be
detained, it left the lower courts poised to engage in a sustained lawmaking exercise
with potentially significant implications for the question of who forms part of a
non-State organized armed group (like al Qaeda, the Taliban or their associated
forces) that is engaged in an armed conflict against a State.
The issue came pointedly to a head when, shortly after the present administration came into office, Judge Bates asked the government to file a brief in the
Handily case3 describing its detention authority under the 2001 Authorization for
the Use of Military Force (AUMF).4
The U.S. government complied by filing its brief of March 13,2009, which argued that (i) when giving content to the broad language of the AUMF the U.S. government, consistent with the Supreme Court's 2004 Hamdi decision,S would look
to the principles of the law of armed confljct, and (ii) because of the lack of codification in the law of armed conflict relating to non-State actors it would sometimes
be necessary to draw analogies to the international laws of war applicable to international armed conflicts between States. The brief then asserted (in relevant part)
that when viewed through this lens the U.S. government had the authority in the
present con fli ct to hold individuals who were "part of' or "substantially supported" al Qaeda, the Taliban or associated forces, but left to be explored in future
cases what the precise contours of those terms would be.
As ofmid-201l, two years (and roughly fifty trial court and appellate decisions)
later, what do we see? As concerns the topic of this article, one thing that appears
to have emerged is an increasingly clear picture that the courts are unlikely to become the laboratory in which the metes and bounds of armed group membership
are worked out. Initially, the district courts sought to draw parallels between
armed groups and traditional armed forces in wrestling with the question of how
LOAC ought to apply. Notably, the 2009 Hamlily (Judge Bates)6 and Gherebi
(Judge Walton)7 opinions took the view that although it was possible to reach the
conclusion that LOAC permitted the detention of certain individuals working
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within the al Qaeda structure based on status, it was necessary that they be part of
the command structure in order for this to be the case. There was arguably some
distance between these two opinions on the question of whether the command
structure must be within the military wing of the armed group, and how the issue
of "support" should be addressed for purposes of determining status (either treating it as contributing to membership analysis or treating it as irrelevant), but they
were operating very much within the LOAC framework, as were later trial court
opinions that may have varied in their interpretation of LOAC but essentially accepted it as the analytic framework.
This has decidedly not, however, been the case at the appellate court level, where
relevant decisions are marked in part by the following characteristics: First, while
the law has not been entirely settled yet, at least one panel has, in the Bihani case,
overtly dismissed the importance of international law in interpretation of the
AUMF in an opinion that, although effectively overruled by an en banc decision
that described this feature of the panel decision as dictum, marks a disinclination
to use the international law of armed conflict as a tool with which to excavate the
meaning of the AUMF.8 Second, although the appellate court continues to offer its
views about what sorts offact patterns would suffice in its views to establish detention authority for purposes of the AUMF, commentators have noted (correctly in
my view) that the Circuit Court's approach to the definition of who may be detained has been far less important to the outcome of cases than its focus on evidentiary issues. Professor Stephen Vladeck noted in May 20 10 that although he found
the D.C. Circuit caselaw governing the scope of the government's detention power
to be troubling, in his view "[ it] has not yet had a meaningful impact on any individual cases. In marked contrast is the D.C. Circuit's jurisprudence concerning the
government's burden of proofin post-Boumediene habeas cases, and how that burden should affect district court assessments of the facts of individuaJ detainees'
claims. "9 Third, as the D.C. Circuit has increasingly focused on what is required for
the government to meet its evidentiary burden, its rulings in this area have had the
effect of creating a substantial zone of deference for executive branch judgment. In
the al-Adahi decision, iO the Circuit Court rejected trial court views that items of evidence must rise or fall on their own, instead requiring that they be looked at as a
mosaic in which suspicious data points are taken as corroborating each other even
if not fully proven on their independent merits. And although "preponderance of
the evidence" continues to be the governing standard, some Circuit judges have
suggested that a lower standard might be appropriate. II
lfthe D.C. Circuit's caselaw indicates a disinclination on its part to decide detention decisions based on a fine parsing ofLOAC, and therefore to become a significant engine driving refinements to the U.S. perspective on that body of law,
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then it is hardly clear that the Supreme Court will be any more eager to wander into
these thickets. To be sure, in the past, the Supreme Court has very much been the
final word on the extension of key rights and privileges to Guantanamo (as was the
case in Rasul (2004),1l Hamdan (2006)13 and Boumedietle (2008)) . There is reason,
however, to believe that the Court may not wade in so dramatically on the issues
being addressed in the present litigation. The composition of the Court has
changed since the pathbreaking decisions of 2004-8 (including through the addition ofJ ustice Kagan, who, because of her involvement as Solicitor General, may be
recused from a number of cases that would present the Court with core detainee
status questions) and so have the atmospherics. Criticism of review procedures and
treatment issues-issues that may have helped draw the Court's attention in the
past-have largely been addressed over the past few years through a combination
of judicial decisions (in particular the confirmation that Common Article 3 applies
to al Qaeda detainees in the Hamdan decision, and the extension of habeas to
Guantanamo in the Boumediene decision) and executive acts (including the treatment guarantees offered under Executive Order 13,491 ).14 Whether a set of facts or
an issue of law might arise that the Court considers in need of its review remains to
be seen, but it would not be surprising if in light of the above the Court were to
continue to maintain its posture of reserve.
It bears mention that the judicial reviewofGuantanamo detainees has occurred
in the detention context, and that there are questions about whether issues relating
to targeting in the context of an armed conflict would even be justiciable. Even if
they were, however, the courts seem to have placed their decisions in a framework
where it appears that they are essentially creating a broad zone of deference for the
exercise of reasonable military judgment. In its current form, it is somewhat difficult to draw from the caselaw more than broad guidance about the boundaries of
that zone, and there isa great deal that is left unsaid about the specific factors that a
specific decision maker in a specific set of circumstances should weigh in taking a
targeting decision. For at least the time being, then, the core issues remain very
much for the executive branch to work through.

Ill. Experts' Proc~s (the ICRC Report)
If the D.C. Circuit has created a de facto zone of deference around military decision making, the same cannot so readily be said of the JCRC's Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities. Because the report has been
much discussed, it will be addressed here only briefly with the following few
observations.
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By way of background, in 2003, the JeRe (together with the Asser Institute)
mounted an effort to provide guidance on the question of when civilians lose their
immunity from attack in both international and non-international armed conflict.
They convened an experts group to study the question and produce a report. The
process was guided by, among others, Nils Melzer, who has done his own scholarly
work on the issue of targeted killings. Among the main findings in the report were
that individuals who perform a "continuous combat function"-Le ., a role that involves direct participation in hostilities on a persistent, non-sporadic and nonspontaneous basi5--Qn behalf of the military wing of an organized armed group
that is party to a conflict become targetable on the basis of their status as "m embers" of the organized armed group until their status changes. With regard to direct
participation in hostilities, the report also found that three components must be
present in order for an action to constitute direct participation in hostilities: a
threshold of harm must be m et; there must be causation; and there must be a "belligerent nexus"-i.e., a sufficient connection between the action and the armed
conflict . Each one of these criteria was explored at some length, and the report set
forth lists of activities that would, or would not, satisfy the criteria as conceived by
the report. IS
The IeRe effort produced a report that, although a contribution to the literature in this area, has generated a fair amount of criticism, and has not become the
gold standard that might originally have been hoped for. There were some major
issues over content. As has been much discussed, the report included a section arguing that there was a legal foundation for the principle that militaries must use the
least harmful m eans in addressing legal targets, which generated great concern
among certain prominent experts who participated in the process, who believed
that it lacked a basis in law or practice, and was not consistent with what had been
discussed in the drafting process. From the operational perspective, the feedback
was that the report was too rigid and complex, and did not give an accurate picture
of State practice or (in some respects) of a practice to which States could realistically aspire. Many of the experts who had participated in the Ie Re process declined to be named in the report, and the U.S. government in its habeas filings
made clear that it did not regard the study as an authoritative statement of the law.
In the final analysis, it appeared that the "experts' process" through which the
product developed could not substitute for the difficult, painstaking and necessary
process of allowing States to develop the law in areas such as this.
Nevertheless, notwithstanding the issues that have been raised with respect to
the Ie Re report, we should not lose sight of two very important contributions that
it made---one substantive and one procedural. Substantively, it is critical to recognize that the study is in som e ways pathbreaking in the level of recognition that it
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gives to the concept that individuals who become members of organized armed
groups lose their civilian status and, while members, can be targeted on the basis of
their status alone for the duration of a NIAC. Moreover, procedurally, the report
has helped to catalyze important discussion among the U.S. government and its
partners about the topics that are addressed in the report. The emerging spectrum
of views on this subject is addressed in the following section.

IV. State Practice
When the ICRC report emerged, one reaction that at least some of its readership
offered was that it would take some time for States to digest its contents and provide some feedback on where it tracked-and did not track-State practice. As
noted above, this process has in fact been under way and, based on conversations
with interlocutors in a number of partner governments, it is possible to offer a general assessment of the spectrum within which the views of the United States and a
number of its closest partners fall. These observations draw from personal and professional exchanges over the past several years, but are relayed in the author's personal capacity .16
A. Overarching Considerations
There is a strong consensus that the point of departure for any analysis of when
civilians become liable to attack under LOAC is the customary principle of distinction. Consistent with this principle, both Additional Protocol 117 (in Article 51(3))
and Additional Protocol Ills (in Article 13 (3)) provide that in armed conflict civilians enjoy protections from being made the object of attack "unless and for such
time as they take a direct part in hostilities."19 Moreover, with respect to NlAC, the
commentary on Article 13(3) additionally explains that "[tJhose who belong to
armed forces or to organized armed groups may be attacked at any time. If a civilian
participates directly in hostilities, it is clear that he will not enjoy any protection
against attacks for as long as his participation lasts."2(1
Taken together, the Additional Protocols and the quoted passage from their
commentary suggest that in armed conflict the following individuals (in addition
to the members of regular armed forces who are liable to attack) relinquish their
protection under international humanitarian law from being made the object of
attack: (i) individuals who become members of organized armed groups (Le., those
referred to in the first sentence of the above-quoted passage from the Article 13 (3)
commentary) and (ii) civilians who are taking direct part in hostilities without belonging to an armed force or organized armed group (i.e., those referred to in the
second sentence of the above-quoted passage).21 Taking into account that current
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treaty law does not provide specific guidance on what it means to be a member of
an organized armed group, or to take direct part in hostilities, the following principles emerge from Article 51(3) of Additional Protocol I and Article 13(3) of Additional Protocol II, and are supported by their Commentaries:
• A critical difference between individuals who lose their protection from attack because of their membership in an organized armed group and individuals
who lose such protection as a result of direct participation in hostilities without
belonging to an organized armed group is that an individual who loses protection
because of membership in an organized armed group may be attacked "at any
time." Because his or her membership deprives him or her of protection, such an
individual does not then need to be actually involved in particular hostilities to be
lawfully attacked at any point in time. 22 By contrast, a civilian who is not a member of an organized armed group and is taking direct part in hostilities loses protection from attack only "for as long as his participation lasts."
• The determination whether an individual is a member (or ceases to be a
member) of an organized armed group or is taking direct part in hostilities should
be taken by the decisionmaker based on information reasonably available to him
or her at the time and taking into account the considerations set forth below.
• Individuals making targeting decisions based on a determination that an individual is a member in an organized armed group, or is taking direct part in hostilities, may not act in the absence of sufficient confidence in the information
establishing the factual basis for the determination. 23 When there is insufficient
confidence in the in formation, the determination should not be made unless and
until such time as sufficient information to make a reasonable determination has
been identified . Depending on the facts, deferral of one determination (e.g., that
an individual is a member of an organized armed group) need not foreclose the
other (e.g., that an individual is directly participating in hostilities).
B. Membership in Organized Armed Groups
As to whether an individual has become a member of an organized armed group
and therefore is liable to attack at any time, there is a range of views among the
United States and its partners on the precise "test" that should be applied to determine membership. Some partners appear to believe that the test for membership
must be based fundamentally on the function performed by the individual in question. But there is also a view that, because of the clandestine and decentralized nature
of certain organized armed groups, it may be difficult to discern a command structure that is clearly analogous to the structures that would be found in State militaries, and that it is accordingly important to be cautious about focusing too
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stringently on functions that can be analogized to those performed in a traditional
command structure. Notwithstanding this spectrwn of views about how to define
the membership test, there is a shared sense that the following facto rs may bear on
such a determination, with the precise weight given to any of these factors dependent on, among other things, the test that is applied:
• The extent to which an individual perfonns a function on behalf of an organized armed group that is both analogous to a function traditionally performed by
a member of a State military who is liable to attack and that is performed within
the command structure of the organization (i.e., the individual is either carrying
out or giving orders to perform such a function ).24 Examples of activities that
would likely qualify include those that would constitute combat, combat support
and combat selVice support functions if performed for a regularly constituted
armed force and carrying arms openly, exercising command over the group or one
of its units, or conducting planning related to the conduct of hostilities. 2S
• The frequency of the individual's preparation, command or execution of
operations amounting to direct participation in hostilities and the intensity of the
damage or hann likely to be in flicted by such participation.
• Other similar factors determined in the reasonable military judgment of the
decision maker to demonstrate an individ ual's integration into the organized
armed group, such as the adoption of a rank, title or style of communication; the
taking of an oath ofloyalty; or the wearing of a uniform or other clothing, adornments or body markings that mark out members in the group--in each case in a
context and manner indicating that these acts of identification reliably connote
meaningful assimilation into the group.2f>
Relevant factors in determining that an individual has ceased to be a member of
an organized armed group include the amount of time that has passed since that
individual has taken relevant action on behalf of the group in question, and
whether he or she affirmatively has disassociated himself or herself from the organized armed group. Decisionmakers should base these determinations on the standard of reasonableness in the prevailing circumstances.
C. Direct Participation in Hostilities
With respect to determining what it means to take "direct part in hostilities,n as a
threshold matter there seems to be a common view that direct participation in hostilities stands in contrast to support by a general population to a nation's war effort.
Civilians who are contributing to a nation's war effort accordingly do not by dint of
this alone lose their protection. Any determination that a civilian is taking part in
hostilities (and thus loses immunity from being made the object of attack) will be
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highly situational and needs to be made by a decisionmaker taking the following
considerations into account:
• Nature of the harm: Is the individual's activity directed at (i) adversely affecting one party's military capacity or operations or enhancing the capacity/operations
of the other, or (ii) killing, injuring or damaging civilian objects or persons?
• CausationJintegration between action and harm: Is there a sufficiently direct
causal link between the individual's relevant act and the relevant harm, or does the
act otherwise form an integral part of coordinated action resulting in that harm?
(Although it is not enough that the act merely occurs during hostilities, there is no
requirement that the act be only a single causal step removed from the harm.)
• Nexus to hostilities: Is the individual's activity linked to an ongoing armed
conflict and is it intended either to disadvantage one party, or advance the interests of an opposing party, in that conflict?
The period during which an individual can be deemed to be directly participating in hostilities is generally viewed to include the period during which that individual is deploying to and returning from the hostile act, but there is a range of
views about whether the acquisition of specific materials necessary for an attack
might under certain circumstances be considered part of the deployment period,
and whether the period in which an individual goes into hiding following an attack
might under certain circumstances be considered part of the return. There is also a
range of views about whether each of the foregoing three factors must be present in
order to make a determination that an individual is directly participating in hostilities (or whether a "totality of the circumstances" approach should govern ), and
about whether certain types of activities must be excluded from the definition of
direct participation in hostilities (e.g., financial support). Moreover, there is a
range of views concerning the relevance of geographic and temporal proximity of
an individual's actions to particular hostile acts in ongoing hostilities.
At some point, as noted above, the frequency or intensity of an individual's direct participation may establish that the individual is a functional member of an
organized armed group, and there is also a perspective that persistent direct
participation in hostilities may establish the individual in question to be contin uously liable to attack for the period of persistent activity even if it is insufficient to
establish functional membershipY Accordingly, where an individual takes direct
part in hostilities, it is important to determine whether the nature and frequency of
the direct participation is such that the loss of protection lasts only for the duration
of specific acts, or is sufficiently persistent that the individual is liable for attack for
a wider period, including the periods between the specific acts.
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v . Conclusion
The above description of views suggests in some ways a clustering by the U.S. government and its partners around certain views that are put forward in the JeRe
study on direct participation in hostilities. There is increasing convergence, for example, around the notion that there are two roads to loss of immunity-membership and direct participation in hostilities. Among the considerations that bear on
membership, there is growing consensus that functional factors echoing some of
the factors from the JeRe's "continuous combat func tion test" are at least relevant. Moreover, the factors that a number of States look at in assessing whether an
action constitutes direct participation in hostilities parallel, to some extent, the
three factors that were captured in the JeRe study.
There are, of course, important differences between what is described in this article and what is described in the JeRe study. The tests and factors described here,
reflecting States' operational experience, are less rigidly constructed. They do not
have the complexity of the tests and factors articulated in the JeRe document. And
there is no reference to the JeRe's suggested rule that parties must use the "least
harmful means" for subduing opponents as described in Section IX of the Interpretative Guidatlce-a test for which it is difficult to detect much, if any. support
among the United States and like-minded partners.
But, as noted above, it is increasingly clear that it will be State practice-rather
than international expert groups or the courts of anyone country-that will drive
the development of a common view within the international community. We are
already seeing the outline of a limited consensus emerging, and, as we move forward, we may well see an increasing level of accord among certain like-minded
States on the question of how individuals lose immunity from being made the object of attack in the context of non-international anned conflicts.
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question of whether an individual may be detained (as the scope of detention authorities in
armed conflict is different from the scope of targeting authorities).
22. As discussed below, there is a range of views on whether individuals who pass the memo
bership threshold lose their civilian status (and are therefore unprivileged belligerents) or reo
main civilians but are deemed to be continuously taking a direct part in hostilities and
accordingly continuously lose their protections from being made the object of attack.
23. There is a range of views about the specific level of doubt that would preclude action
from being taken.
24. There is a range of views wi th respect to the significance of combat support and combat
service su pport in assessing membersh ip.
25. There is a range of views wi th respect: to the significance of combat support and combat
service support in assessing membership.
26. There is a range of views about the extent to which indications of formal membership
(such as swearing an oath of loyalty) may be considered.
27. Under th is view, factors relevant to whether an individual ceases to be liable to attack be·
cause of direct participation in hostilities include (b ut are no t limited to) theamount of time that
has passed since the last relevan t act, and whether there are concrete and verifiable mcts or persuasive indicia that the individual has affirmatively foresworn taking a direct part in hostilities.
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